

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

March 24, 2020
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TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

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MAR 26 2020 ✓
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING FID No. 023-19

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 023-19. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on March 2, 2020. I have reviewed and adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On May 27, 2019, at approximately 2124 hours, Communications Division (CD) broadcast "Harbor units, shooting just occurred 1071 West 254th Street, standby for additional, Incident No. 5621." At 2124:57 hours, CD made a second broadcast, "Harbor units, your shooting just occurred at 1071 West 254th Street is now an ambulance shooting just occurred, possibly one victim down, standby for additional." At 2125:37 hours, CD broadcast, "Harbor units, shooting just occurred 1071 West 254th Street, 1071 West 254th Street, possibly coming from the parking lot area, unknown person that possibly shot a shotgun and people heard screaming children, Incident 5269, RD 503."

Officers J. Singh, Serial No. 42997, and D. Ivan, Serial No. 42981, Harbor Patrol Division, heard CD broadcast an *ambulance shooting* call and responded to the location Code 3. According to Officer Singh, after exiting his vehicle he drew his service pistol and searched the location for the armed suspect. After not locating the suspect, Officer Singh holstered his service pistol. As they were walking through the apartment complex they heard *audible gunshots coming northbound from their location*. Shortly thereafter CD broadcasted additional information and Officers Singh and Ivan entered their police vehicle and decided to canvass the surrounding area for possible victims and the suspect (**Drawing/Exhibiting and Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video (BWV) Activation**).

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¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

Officers C. Munoz, Serial No. 43256, and D. Campos Serial No. 42969, Harbor Patrol Division, were on patrol and in close proximity to 1071 West 254th Street when CD broadcast the initial shooting call. According to Officer Munoz they were *pretty much down the street from the location* and responded to the call. While *searching* the location for evidence of a shooting, Officer Munoz heard *approximately three or four shots, north a block or two away*. In response, Officer Campos broadcast, "*Information only shots fired in the area*" and requested an air unit.

According to Officer Campos, upon arrival to the location he exited his police vehicle, drew his service pistol and searched for the armed suspect. Officer Campos recalled that the comments of the radio call stated there was a shooting at the location and it was his belief that a suspect may be at scene armed with a gun. Officer Campos cleared the location, looking for the suspect **(Drawing/Exhibiting)**.

At 2129:07 hours, CD broadcast a fourth update, "Harbor units, possible shooting just occurred 1036 West 253rd Street, 1036 West 253rd Street. Suspect is male Hispanic possibly mid-30s, bald wearing an orange, blue, and white stripe shirt, holding a rifle in his left hand, last seen walking out of the alley. Code Three, Incident 5654, RD 503."

After finding no evidence of a shooting at 1071 West 254th Street, and hearing the additional CD broadcast, Officers Munoz and Campos left the location and began canvassing the area of 252nd Street and *Marigold* Avenue for the suspect.

Officers J. Rodriguez, Serial No. 40926, and K. Morales, Serial No. 43425, Harbor Patrol Division, heard the initial radio broadcast of a *shooting* and responded to the area. According to Officer Morales, after hearing multiple radio calls broadcast and while enroute to the call they encountered Officers Munoz and Campos near the intersection of 253rd Street and *Marigold* Avenue and were advised that there was a suspect *with a rifle in the area*. Officers Rodriguez and Morales then began canvassing the area of 253rd Street *east* of *Marigold* Avenue for the suspect.

Officers C. Portillo, Serial No. 43185, and M. Jackson, Serial No. 43217, Harbor Patrol Division, heard the initial radio call broadcast and initiated a Code Three response. According to Officer Portillo, after hearing updated information broadcast which indicated that the suspect had fled the initial location on foot and was *in the alleyway*, Officers Portillo and Jackson began canvassing *eastbound* 252nd Street between *Marigold* Avenue and *Petroleum* Avenue. Officer Jackson broadcast that they were Code Six, *Marigold and 252nd* **(Additional/Equipment – BWV Activation)**.

Officers J. Blanco, Serial No. 41341, and K. Chavez, Serial No. 41195, Harbor Area, Gang Enforcement Detail (GED), broadcast over Harbor Area base frequency that they were responding to the call from Harbor Community Police Station. The officers were in full uniform and driving a marked black and white hybrid police vehicle **(Additional/Equipment – Required Equipment)**.

According to Officer Blanco, as the initial radio call was broadcast, he was seated on the passenger side of his police vehicle completing a Field Data Report for a previous traffic stop of a vehicle in which the occupants were known gang members from the Harbor City BLS criminal street gang. The traffic stop had occurred on Belle Porte Avenue between 253rd Street and 254th Street. After hearing the initial radio call, Officer Blanco repositioned himself to the driver's seat and broadcast, "5 George 63, show me enroute to the shooting call." Officer Chavez was inside Harbor Community Police Station and returned to the police vehicle. The officers activated their BWV and discussed the comments of the call while enroute to 1071 West 254th Street. As the officers were responding Code Three, Officer Blanco heard CD broadcast an *Ambulance shooting, man down*, located in the same area as the initial shooting call. Officer Blanco advised Officer Chavez that due to the additional call at the same location, he believed the calls to be valid and that an actual shooting had likely occurred.

The FID investigation determined that Officers Blanco and Chavez had worked together for approximately one week and had been assigned to conduct crime suppression for the Varrio Harbor City Baby Locos "BLS" criminal street gang. During that time, they had discussed tactics, contact and cover roles, foot pursuit containment versus apprehension modes and BLS gang information. Additionally, they had also discussed different scenarios such as use of force incidents, along with their roles and responsibilities regarding less lethal options and radio communication.

According to Officer Blanco, while he was driving to the location of the radio call, an additional call of "shots heard in the area" was broadcast. The comments stated that the person reporting observed *the suspect, wearing an orange and white striped shirt leaving the alley behind where the previous call had been generated, with a shotgun*. Officer Blanco mentioned to Officer Chavez that he has noticed that whenever *this girl comes around, she's a known Royal Harbor City gang associate, there's always shootings*. The officers also discussed the previous traffic stop they had in the same area with known Harbor City gang members and Officer Blanco recalls that *one of the suspects that was in the vehicle lives on 254th Street*.

At 2131:41 hours, Officers Blanco and Chavez arrived in the area of 1071 West 254th Street. According to Officer Blanco, upon their arrival to the area he recalled that one of the suspects from the previous traffic stop *lives on 254th, between Normandie and Marigold, so as the officers passed his house, they slowed down and make sure there was nobody down there*. The officers proceeded towards 1036 West 253rd Street and as they were *getting close to 254th and Petroleum*, Officer Blanco observed a male *on the north curb of 254th*. Officer Blanco asked the male, "Did you hear any shooting?" The male replied, "Yes. In the back," and pointed toward 253rd Street (**Debriefing Point No. 1**).

According to Officer Blanco, he and Officer Chavez then drove *northbound Petroleum Avenue from 254th*. As they were *passing the alley*, they observed a *black and white unit in the east/west alley, between 254th and 253rd Streets*. They proceed to 253rd Street because, according to Officer Blanco, gang suspects would sometimes *get dropped off from a vehicle, they do a*

shooting and then they run one or two blocks away, get back in the car, and flee the area. Officers Blanco and Chavez continued driving to 253rd and initiate a westbound turn from Petroleum onto 253rd.

Note: Officers Blanco and Chavez did not place themselves Code Six when they arrived in the area of the shooting call (**Debriefing Point No. 2**).

According to Officer Blanco, he and Officer Chavez were *trying to look for the address to make sure that there's no victims down*. As the officers were traveling westbound on 253rd, Officer Blanco shined his spotlight on the side of the *building to locate the address of the building*. The officers *already had an understanding that they were looking for a suspect armed with a shotgun*. They were *looking for the suspect and at the same time, looking for victims*. As they continued westbound 253rd Street from Petroleum Avenue, he observed a male, later identified as K. Rosales, matching the description of the suspect from the radio calls, walking eastbound, midblock on the north sidewalk of 253rd Street. Rosales was wearing a striped shirt and was *armed with a rifle, walking on the north sidewalk*.

According to Officer Blanco, Rosales “was holding it with two arms. Port arms. Right hand above the butt of the gun and his left hand on the barrel.” Rosales began running on the north sidewalk toward the officers’ location. Officer Blanco stated, “There, there, there,” and *angled the police vehicle toward Rosales in a position of advantage as he immediately recognized that Rosales had a rifle*. Officer Blanco stopped the police vehicle, immediately exited and stated, “Hey, let me see your fucking hands. Drop it, Drop it.” (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Profanity and Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands**).

According to Officer Chavez, he observed Rosales wearing a blue and white striped shirt. Rosales was walking east on the north sidewalk of 253rd Street with *the rifle in his right hand, cross his body, holding it by a pistol grip*. Officer Chavez *immediately deployed out of the vehicle and drew his service pistol (Drawing/Exhibiting)*.

According to Officer Blanco, he observed that Rosales *ignored these commands* and Rosales *continued running east*. Officer Blanco then drew his service pistol *due to the fact that Rosales was behind cover, and already had a position of advantage over the officers*. Rosales *has a rifle, and he's behind cover as he's moving (Drawing/Exhibiting)*.

Note: Both Officers Chavez and Blanco advised FID investigators that they believed they each had fired in three separate sequences of fire. Although the officers’ BWV captured the OIS, due to the low light conditions, blurred imagery from the officers’ movement, the backlighting from the illumination of the officers’ flashlights, and the speed at which the multiple simultaneous rounds were fired from two officers, the FID investigators had difficulty distinguishing the officers’ sequences of fire. The total time lapse of the entire OIS was approximately four seconds between the first and last rounds fired by the officers.

According to Officer Chavez, he then began *giving Rosales commands to “stop, drop the gun.”* At that point, Rosales started *running eastbound towards the officers on the sidewalk* while Officer Chavez and Officer Blanco are *still on the street*. Officer Chavez observed that Rosales passed the officers as Rosales was *running east*, even as the officers are *still running east as well*. As Rosales ran *past Officers Chavez and Blanco*, Rosales pointed *the rifle at the officers*. Fearing he would be shot, Officer Chavez fired seven rounds from his service pistol at Rosales to stop the deadly threat (**Debriefing Point Nos. 3 and 4, and Lethal Use of Force – Volley 1**).

According to Officer Chavez, *the whole time*, Rosales was *running eastbound*, Officer Chavez was *running eastbound, telling him, “Stop. Drop it. Stop, stop, stop.”* Rosales ignored their *commands*. Officer Chavez observed Rosales *continuing to run and eventually make his way to a driveway, just west of Petroleum*. Rosales ran *northbound through that driveway*, and *at that point*, Rosales looked back at Officer Chavez. Officer Chavez observed Rosales’ *barrel come up again*. Fearing Rosales was going to fire at him, Officer Chavez fired four additional rounds at Rosales to stop the deadly threat (**Lethal Use of Force – Volley 2**).

Note: The FID investigation determined that Officer Chavez fired a total of 11 rounds in two sequences for fire from an increasing distance of 18 to 28 feet.

According to Officer Blanco, Rosales, “Kept ignoring our commands and kept moving eastbound on 253rd behind cover. He passed our black and white, and as he’s passing our black and white, he’s looking in our direction trying to acquire a target.” Officer Blanco *started moving eastbound himself trying to parallel Rosales to gain a better position because he did not want to lose sight of him*. Officer Blanco continued giving Rosales verbal commands to “drop the gun” and observed Rosales carry the rifle *in port arms, turning to his right and pointing the gun* toward his direction. Fearing he would be shot, Officer Blanco fired two rounds from his service pistol at Rosales to stop the deadly threat (**Debriefing Point Nos. 3 and 4, in addition to Lethal Use of Force – Volley 1**).

According to Officer Blanco, he observed Rosales *still moving* on the sidewalk behind parked vehicles. Officer Blanco lost sight of Rosales, and kept *moving eastbound with Rosales* as Officer Chavez moved alongside him as well. Officer Blanco *ran a little bit to try to reacquire Rosales’ position from behind the car* and observed Rosales again point the rifle at him. Officer Blanco fired *two to three* rounds from his service pistol at Rosales to stop the deadly threat (**Lethal Use of Force – Volley 2**).

According to Officer Blanco, as Rosales *continued to move behind cover*, he *repositioned himself to another position of advantage*. Officer Blanco was *afraid that Rosales was going to achieve a superior position of advantage*, and continued to move *to another position where he was able to see Rosales’ actions*. Officer Blanco observed that Rosales was *still pointing the rifle in his direction*. Officer Blanco fired his last *two to three* rounds from his service pistol at Rosales to stop the deadly threat (**Lethal Use of Force – Volley 3**).

Note: The FID investigation determined that Officer Blanco fired a total of eight rounds in three sequences of fire from an increasing distance of 34 to 47 feet.

According to Officer Blanco, he observed Rosales fall to the ground as he is shooting at Rosales. Officer Blanco did not know if Rosales was struck by gunfire and described the situation as, "Because when Rosales goes down, he hits the floor and gets back up like if nothing had happened. He gets back up. The rifle is still in hand." Officer Blanco observed Rosales *going eastbound, and then that's when he starts going northbound through the parking lot and still trying to point the rifle in the officers' direction*. Officers Blanco and Chavez *were going to go chasing him*, but instead redeployed and *continued eastbound on 253rd towards Petroleum*. They then ran *northbound on Petroleum from 253rd*. Officer Blanco utilized his hand-held radio to broadcast, "5G63 shots fired. Shots fired. Officer Needs Help. Petroleum and 254."

According to the FID investigation, Officers Blanco and Chavez did not follow Rosales through the parking lot. Instead, they ran to the northwest corner of Petroleum Avenue and 253rd Street and observed Rosales as he jumped over a fence at the northeast corner of the apartment complex and onto Petroleum Avenue.

According to Officer Blanco, he observed Rosales *come back out from the apartment building that he had gone behind*, and gave Rosales *commands to stop*, but Rosales ignored his commands and continued to flee northbound Petroleum Avenue on foot with officers pursuing him on foot from a distance. Officer Blanco observed *an additional unit* responding southbound in their direction. The officers began yelling, "Hey, suspect, suspect. He might still be armed with a rifle. He might still be armed with a rifle."

Officers J. Bryant, Serial No. 41858 and R. Vint, Serial No. 40997, Harbor Patrol Division, had heard multiple CD broadcasts regarding *an ambulance shooting* and responded *Code Three* to the area. According to Officer Bryant as they were approaching the general area of the calls they received updated information *that the suspect had fired additional rounds and was carrying a rifle down an alley*.

According to Officer Vint, as he and Officer Bryant approached the intersection of 252nd Street and Petroleum Avenue, *another radio call came out saying shots fired at Petroleum and 252nd*. Officer Bryant made contact with a family who was sitting on their balcony and asked them if they heard someone firing a gun. As Officer Bryant was speaking to the family from the police vehicle, Officers Bryant and Vint *heard approximately eight to ten gunshots*. After hearing the gunshots and while still seated in his police vehicle Officer Vint drew his service pistol *and had it down at his side ready to go* (**Drawing/Exhibiting and Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Drawing Service Pistol While Seated in Vehicle**).

According to Officer Bryant, he then drove *southbound* on Petroleum Avenue and observed Rosales *kind of tumble out of the alleyway and run eastbound* in front of their vehicle. Rosales *matched the description* of the suspect and continued running northbound on the east sidewalk in their direction. Officers Bryant and Vint gave Rosales *numerous commands to stop* and to *show his hands*. Officers Bryant and Vint then exited their police vehicle. As

Officer Bryant exited his police vehicle he drew his service pistol. Both Officers Bryant and Vint chased after Rosales on foot with their service pistols drawn. Rosales refused to obey their commands and continued *running while holding his waistband with his right hand (Drawing/Exhibiting)*.

According to Officer Ivan, he canvassed the area in his police vehicle with Officer Singh. Due to the comments of the radio call being that shots were fired and also from hearing gunshots being fired in the area, Officer Ivan drew his service pistol while seated in his police vehicle. Officer Ivan then heard a radio broadcast of *shots fired, officer needs help* and that *the shooter is running northbound Petroleum*. Ivan drove his police vehicle southbound on Petroleum Avenue and observed several officers in foot pursuit of Rosales. Officer Ivan saw that Rosales and the officers pursuing him were running in Officer Ivan's direction. Officer Ivan then *drove towards* Rosales in his police vehicle and parked the police vehicle **(Debriefing Point No 5, Drawing/Exhibiting and Additional Tactical Debrief Topic – Drawing Service Pistol While Seated in Vehicle)**.

According to Officer Singh, Officer Ivan used their *patrol vehicle to stop* Rosales' *pathway from running any further*. Rosales was able to run past their vehicle and Officers Ivan and Singh both exited their police vehicle. As Officer Singh exited his vehicle, he again drew his service pistol. Both Officers Singh and Ivan engaged in the foot pursuit of Rosales with their service pistols drawn. After Rosales was taken to the ground, Officers Ivan and Singh holstered their service pistols and assisted in maintaining control of Rosales until he could be handcuffed **(Debriefing Point No. 5, Drawing/Exhibiting and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Running with Service Pistol, and Crossfire)**.

According to Officer Morales he and Officer Rodriguez were *eastbound, mid-block* on 253rd Street from *Marigold* Avenue toward *Petroleum* Avenue when they observed a vehicle parked in the roadway near the intersection of 253rd Street and Petroleum Avenue facing westbound. Officer Morales heard someone in the vicinity of the vehicle *screaming, "Drop it" or "Put it down"* followed by the sounds of gunshots.

According to Officer Rodriguez he heard someone yell, "Drop the rifle, drop the rifle, drop the rifle," **(Additional/Equipment – Separation)**.

According to Officer Campos, he drew his service pistol a second time during the incident. Officer Campos heard that Rosales was running northbound on Petroleum Avenue. Officer Campos observed Rosales running and reaching for his waistband. Officer Campos and other officers engaged in a foot pursuit of Rosales. Officer Campos unholstered his service pistol since he did not know if Rosales was still armed **(Drawing/Exhibiting)**.

According to Officer Portillo he heard CD broadcast *officer needs help, shots fired* and an unknown officer broadcast *northbound Petroleum*. Officers Portillo and Jackson immediately responded in their black and white police vehicle to the intersection of 252nd Street and Petroleum Avenue. Officer Portillo observed Rosales, who matched the description of the possible shooting suspect, *running* in his direction and away from officers who were pursuing

him on foot. Fearing Rosales was going to shoot him, Officer Portillo exited his police vehicle and drew his service pistol (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

The investigation determined that while their service pistols were drawn, Officers Munoz, Campos, Chavez, Blanco, and Morales engaged in foot pursuit of Rosales (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Crossfire**).

According to Officer Jackson as she approached the intersection of 252nd Street and Petroleum Avenue she observed Rosales *running northbound Petroleum passing 252nd* and he *looked towards the lights* of their police vehicle. Officer Portillo stopped their police vehicle and Officer Jackson exited the vehicle and followed Officer Portillo in the foot pursuit of Rosales. As she was running, Officer Jackson saw that Rosales *was already on the ground* being taken into custody by multiple officers. Officer Jackson was unable to see what force was used to take Rosales into custody as multiple officers were standing between her and Rosales.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Bryant's BWV captured Rosales running to the east sidewalk and then north toward him. Officers Bryant and Vint can be heard giving Rosales commands to stop and put his hands up. Rosales ignored these commands and continued running past the officers. Officers Bryant, Vint and Portillo chased after Rosales on foot. Officer Bryant caught up to Rosales and pushed him from behind causing Rosales to lose his balance and fall face down onto the sidewalk. Officer Ivan used body weight to control Rosales' legs as he searched Rosales' waistband for weapons. Within moments additional officers arrived and Rosales was taken into custody with applications of non-lethal force (**Non-Lethal Use of Force and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Stepping on Limbs and Profanity**).

According to Officer Bryant, he observed Rosales exit an alley and run north on Petroleum Avenue. Officer Bryant gave Rosales several commands to stop and began to pursue Rosales on foot. When Rosales ignored his commands, Officer Bryant conducted a one-officer takedown and then placed his bodyweight on Rosales to control his movements (**Non-lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Campos, he observed Rosales running from a group of officers. Rosales was taken to the ground and laid in a "fetal" position. Officer Campos assisted the officers handcuffing Rosales by placing his bodyweight on Rosales to control his movements (**Non-lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Singh, he observed Rosales run past his police vehicle. Officer Singh then exited his police vehicle and once he approached the area, he observed Rosales on the ground being taken into custody by a group of officers. Officer Singh assisted the officers by utilizing a firm grip on Rosales' left arm to help control his movements (**Non-lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Ivan, he observed Rosales running from a group of officers. Rosales then ended up on the ground and Officer Ivan assisted by placing his bodyweight on Rosales to control his movements as other officers handcuffed Rosales (**Non-lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Portillo, he holstered his service pistol and began to pursue Rosales on foot and broadcast his location. Officer Portillo then observed Rosales prone out on the ground and assisted the other officers in taking him into custody by placing his left knee on Rosales' right shoulder and his left hand on Rosales' left shoulder to control his movements (**Non-lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Vint, he observed Rosales run out of an alley and fall to the ground. Officer Vint observed Rosales get up and run northbound on Petroleum Avenue on the east sidewalk. Officer Vint utilized parked cars as cover as he paralleled Rosales from the street until he observed a police vehicle traveling southbound on Petroleum Avenue approach and position their vehicle in Rosales' path. Officer Vint then went around the police vehicle and observed officers had Rosales detained on the ground and were struggling to handcuff his arms. Officer Vint approached and utilized a firm grip on Rosales' right arm and physical force to pull Rosales' right arm out from under his body so officers could complete the handcuffing (**Non-lethal Use of Force**).

According to Officer Chavez, *there was another officer running behind Officers Blanco and Chavez trying to catch up to help. Officer Chavez directed him to check the alley for the rifle because he had dumped it somewhere. After Rosales was taken into custody, Officers Blanco and Chavez made their way back to the alley and ensured the rifle had been located.*

Note: The FID investigation determined that Officers Rodriguez and Morales were directed by Officer Blanco to secure the rifle.

At the UOFRB, FID investigators presented that once Rosales entered the parking lot of 1033 West 253rd Street, he had maintained possession of the rifle for approximately 159 feet before discarding it over a chain link fence into the alley that runs east and west between 252nd Street and 253rd Street.

Sergeant J. West, Serial No. 34310, Harbor Area, GED, arrived at the incident in response to the initial radio call. Sergeant West obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Officer Chavez. He also ensured that Officer Chavez was separated and monitored. In addition, Sergeant West set up a Command Post (**Additional/Equipment – BWV Activation and Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) Activation**).

Sergeant J. Huett, Serial No. 34679, Harbor Patrol Division, responded, obtained a PSS from Officer Blanco, and assumed monitoring responsibilities of Officer Blanco.

Sergeant J. Talmage, Serial No. 34671, Harbor Patrol Division, responded and ensued Rosales received medical attention. Sergeant Talmage received information that Rosales had possibly shot someone prior to, and unrelated to the OIS, and that the victim had been transported to Kaiser Permanente Hospital – South Bay Medical Center. Sergeant Talmage directed Officers M Carlos, Serial No. 40758, and D. Garcia, Serial No. 42063, Harbor Patrol Division, to respond to Kaiser Permanente Hospital to investigate further. Once at Kaiser Permanente Hospital, Officers

Carlos and Garcia learned that a shooting had taken place at 1071 West 254th Street and that the victim was deceased. A crime scene was established and proper notifications were made.

Lieutenant M. Loomis, Serial No. 27794, Watch Commander, Harbor Patrol Division, responded to the Command Post after Rosales was taken into custody and the crime scene was established and assumed the role of Incident Commander.

FINDINGS

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Officers Blanco, Chavez, Bryant, Campos, Portillo, and Vint. Administrative Disapproval, Officers Ivan and Singh.

Drawing and Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Blanco, Chavez, Bryant, Campos, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Vint.

Non-Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Bryant, Campos, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Vint.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Blanco and Chavez.

ANALYSIS²

Detention

Officers Blanco and Chavez responded to a radio call of an ambulance shooting in a known gang location. CD had broadcast several related calls with different locations and information regarding the suspect. As multiple Harbor Patrol Division officers canvassed the area of the calls, Officers Blanco and Chavez observed Rosales walking on the north sidewalk of 253rd Street, armed with a rifle. Officers Blanco and Chavez immediately stopped their police vehicle and deployed on Rosales. Officers Blanco and Chavez began de-escalation techniques by verbalizing with Rosales in an attempt to bring an end to the incident peacefully. Rosales ignored the officers' commands, began to run toward them, and pointed the rifle at them resulting in an OIS.

Rosales then fled from the officers on foot into a parking lot and discarded the rifle in a nearby alley. Rosales continued to attempt to evade Officers Blanco and Chavez and fled onto Petroleum Avenue where Officers Munoz, Campos, Bryant, and Vint observed him and gave him verbal commands to stop. When Rosales refused to submit to arrest, Officers Bryant, Campos, Singh, Ivan, Portillo, and Vint utilized non-lethal force to take him into custody. The officers' actions were legal, appropriate, and within Department standards.

² The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

TACTICS

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *"The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."*

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: *"A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication*

(Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – Officers Blanco and Chavez were both assigned to Harbor Area GED and had worked together for approximately one week. Officers Blanco and Chavez had been assigned to conduct crime suppression for the Varrio Harbor City Baby Locos "BLS" criminal street gang. During that time, they had discussed tactics, contact and cover roles, foot pursuit containment versus apprehension modes, and BLS gang information. Additionally, they had also discussed various scenarios such as uses of force incidents, along with their roles and responsibilities regarding less lethal options and radio communication.

While enroute to the radio call, Officers Blanco and Chavez listened to the multiple updates from CD and discussed the comments of the call. The UOFRB noted, and I concur, that Officers Blanco and Chavez may have benefitted from developing a more detailed tactical plan for this particular incident prior to arriving at the location. It was also noted, that while it would have been preferred that the officers created a more specific plan during this incident, the rapid escalation of Rosales pointing the rifle at the officers reduced their opportunity to do so once they arrived at scene.

In addition, Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos all responded to the ambulance shooting radio call and subsequent "Officer Needs Help, Shots Fired" request. As the responding officers searched the area and heard multiple radio broadcasts that officers needed help, they also heard unknown officers yelling that Rosales was in possession of a rifle. The responding officers then observed Rosales fleeing the location on foot. Not knowing the condition of the original officers who had requested for help, Officers Campos, Singh, Ivan, Portillo, Bryant, and Vint immediately reacted to the Rosales' actions during this rapidly unfolding and dynamic incident in order to bring an end to the incident, and increase their ability to locate any injured officers or citizens and render aid.

Assessment – Officers Blanco and Chavez first began to assess the incident as they responded to the shots fired radio call and discussed the known gang activity in the vicinity. The officers then observed Rosales walking in the area and assessed his appearance and recognized that he matched the suspect description that was previously broadcast. The officers observed that Rosales was armed with a rifle, which they assessed as having superior firepower to their service pistols to which they acted quickly and decisively. They interpreted Rosales as a violent suspect who may be willing to utilize his rifle on them, as he had likely utilized the rifle to shoot the reported victim nearby. The officers continuously assessed Rosales' movements and direction of travel and made the decision to draw their service pistols as they believed the situation could escalate to the use of deadly force.

As Officers Chavez and Blanco utilized verbal commands in an attempt to resolve the situation peacefully, they assessed Rosales' lack of cooperation and the deadly threat that he presented as he began to run in their direction holding the rifle. When Officers Chavez and Blanco observed Rosales point the rifle in their direction, Officers Chavez and Blanco assessed that they were faced with an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death. Officers Chavez and Blanco utilized lethal force to stop Rosales' actions. During the volleys of rounds being fired which lasted approximately four seconds, Officers Chavez and Blanco continually assessed Rosales' actions, and when his movements indicated that he no longer posed a threat, Officers Chavez and Blanco stopped firing their service pistols.

In addition, Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos observed Rosales fleeing on foot in an attempt to evade capture. Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh and Campos assessed that Rosales was a violent fleeing suspect that, due to public safety concerns, had to be apprehended immediately. As Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos pursued Rosales on foot, they assessed whether Rosales continued to be armed, and when they did not immediately observe any weapons, they acted quickly and decisively to effect an arrest.

Time – Officers Blanco and Chavez were faced with a rapidly escalating incident when Rosales quickly ran toward them armed with a high-powered rifle. Although the officers' options were very limited, video evidence depicts that the officers used the "Distance + Time = Cover" concept when confronted by Rosales who was running just feet from them on the sidewalk. The officers remained in the street and moved from vehicle to vehicle using them as cover while still maintaining a line of sight on the armed suspect and continually verbalized with him to surrender. The officers' belief of the criminal activity already conducted by Rosales at the location presented a significant concern for the safety of the community, as well as for all of the officers at scene. Officers Blanco and Chavez did not have the opportunity to utilize additional time, which may have allowed Rosales to escape into the community armed with a high-powered rifle.

In addition, Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos initially had not yet determined that Rosales was unarmed, thus they utilized distance to create additional time for the events to unfold as they verbalized with Rosales. The officers demonstrated restraint and discipline as they quickly redeployed and re-assessed the situation. Officers Chavez, Blanco, Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos were in an open neighborhood surrounded by many occupied residences with limited options for cover. Additionally, having prior knowledge that suspects could either force their way into a nearby dwelling or find an associate location to hide within, the officers knew that if not immediately apprehended, the violent suspect may escape. This limited their ability to delay approaching Rosales and making the arrest.

Redeployment and/or Containment – Upon observation of Rosales' rifle, Officers Blanco and Chavez tactically redeployed from the police vehicle and moved to nearby cover behind parked vehicles as they verbalized with Rosales to submit to arrest. When Rosales' ignored the commands and continued to close the distance between himself and Officers Chavez and Blanco, the officers moved from cover to cover as they maintained visual contact with Rosales. After the end of the OIS, Officers Chavez and Blanco did not pursue Rosales into the darkened parking lot, rather, they demonstrated situational awareness and discipline and redeployed away from the immediate vicinity and began to set up a containment via their hand-held radio.

In addition, Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos observed Rosales fleeing on foot. Due to the rapid escalation of the Rosales' actions, the officers had a limited opportunity to utilize other options and instead initiated a foot pursuit after Rosales. The short duration of the incident did not allow for containment to be established prior to taking Rosales into custody. The UOFRB was critical of Officers Ivan and Singh's decision to utilize their police vehicle to block the path of Rosales. This tactic placed both Officers Ivan and Singh in close proximity of Rosales, reduced their ability to react to Rosales' actions, and reduced their options to utilize their police vehicle as cover. The UOFRB would have preferred that Officers Ivan and Singh parked their vehicle further away thus creating more distance between them and Rosales.

Other Resources – Numerous officers responded to the location in response to the initial radio call. Due to the sudden escalation of the incident by Rosales as he pointed the rifle at Officers Chavez and Blanco, the first broadcast from the officers for additional resources to their location was Officer Blanco's broadcast, "Shots fired, shots fired, Officer Needs Help, Petroleum and

254.” Officers Blanco and Chavez were aware that additional resources were already at scene and nearby. Additionally, Officer Blanco requested additional units for a perimeter for the outstanding suspect. The additional officers who responded to the location worked in cooperation to take Rosales into custody.

Lines of Communication – Officers Blanco and Chavez communicated with each other as they responded to the radio call. Officer Chavez provided his partner pertinent information on CD updates, radio calls, locations, and the suspect description. Officers Chavez and Blanco also discussed the possible connection to a known Harbor City criminal street gang at the location.

While canvassing the area, Officer Blanco observed Rosales and immediately notified Officer Chavez. After exiting the vehicle, Officers Blanco and Chavez continued to verbalize with Rosales in an effort to gain his compliance, but Rosales failed to drop the rifle as directed. Rosales continued to refuse to comply or verbally respond to the officers even after the first volley of gunfire from the officers. Rosales responded by again pointing the high-powered rifle at the officers while he continued to flee on foot. Despite the Harbor Area base frequency being unavailable due to an unidentified officer having an open microphone, Officers Blanco and Chavez communicated to the additional officers at scene by yelling out that Rosales was armed with a rifle. This information was imperative to the safety of the other officers as the rifle afforded Rosales an extended range to fire upon officers.

In addition, Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos were responding to a rapidly unfolding incident and had minimal time to discuss tactical roles, but worked together to take Rosales into custody. The officers observed Rosales fleeing on foot and verbally communicated with each other and continued to order Rosales to submit to arrest. Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos coordinated with each other and took Rosales into custody.

The UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Blanco, Chavez, Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos attempted to de-escalate the incident, but Rosales’ aggressive actions to evade detention, including his pointing of the rifle at Officers Blanco and Chavez, fleeing on foot, and his violent physical resistance prompted the officers to resort to both Lethal and Non-Lethal force on Rosales.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Tactical Planning

Officers must approach every contact, whether a consensual encounter or a lawful detention, with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

Operational success is based on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate during critical incidents. The officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall

safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. A sound tactical plan should be implemented to ensure minimal exposure to the officers, while keeping in mind officer safety concerns.

In this case, Officers Blanco and Chavez engaged in limited communication with each other to formulate a tactical plan to approach the suspect, in the event they located him. The officers engaged in basic planning prior to arriving at the location. Officer Blanco, a gang expert of the Harbor City BLS criminal street gang, explained to Officer Chavez that one of the occupants of a vehicle they had stopped earlier that same night lived in the general vicinity of the shooting call. Officer Blanco further referenced a female gang associate and advised when she typically arrives in the area, "There's always shootings."

Although Officers Blanco and Chavez were tenured GED officers who had knowledge of the area, I would have preferred that the officers had taken the opportunity to plan a more coordinated effort to approach the suspect and take him into custody.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that while identified as an area for improvement, the officers' actions were not a deviation from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Code Six

When a unit is conducting a field investigation and no assistance is anticipated, a "Code Six," followed by the location, shall be broadcast. A unit shall not go "Code Six" until it arrives at the scene of a call.

Units on "Code Six" status shall remain available for reassignment to priority calls by monitoring their radio frequencies. A unit on "Code Six" status may indicate to the dispatcher additional circumstances which will make the unit unavailable for assignment to a priority call. These circumstances may include:

- Suspect in custody;
- Primary unit at a crime scene; and/or,
- Required at a backup, assistance, or help location.

Note: *The unit shall notify the dispatcher as soon as it is again available for radio calls (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 120.40).*

Officers Blanco and Chavez did not advise CD of their Code Six location upon arrival to the area of the radio call. The purpose of broadcasting a Code Six location is to advise CD and officers in the area of their location and the nature of the field investigation, should the incident escalate and necessitate the response of additional personnel.

In this case, multiple radio calls were generated within a two block radius and Officers Blanco and Chavez responded to the original radio call. The officers had knowledge that additional units were responding to the location, and upon their arrival, they observed multiple units at various locations, including a Harbor Patrol Division supervisor. Moments after, Officers Blanco and Chavez located Rosales within the same area armed with a rifle, which required them to immediately tactically deploy from their police vehicle.

Officers are required to balance officer safety considerations against the need to make a timely Code Six broadcast. Officers must be afforded some discretion in determining the appropriate time to make their broadcast. Department tactical training allows for officer safety concerns to take precedence over making an immediate Code Six broadcast.

The officers were faced with a rapidly unfolding situation and the UOFRB discussed their preference that the officers had placed themselves Code Six upon arriving in the area. The UOFRB also recognized that the Harbor and Southeast Divisions base frequency contained heavy radio traffic due to multiple radio calls and also that an inadvertent open microphone temporarily prevented additional broadcasts. The UOFRB noted that the incident rapidly escalated for the officers due to the actions of Rosales.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Blanco and Chavez' actions were a substantial deviation, with justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 3 Apprehension vs. Containment Mode/Pursuing Armed Suspects

Apprehension versus Containment: *There are two pursuit modes officers may use when a suspect flees on foot, apprehension mode or containment mode. Some factors that will influence an officer's decision to operate in the apprehension or containment mode are the suspect's actions, officer's experience, training, physical fitness level, location and available resources.*

During apprehension mode, officers work as a team, pursue and attempt to overtake a fleeing suspect until apprehending the suspect, making the decision to discontinue the foot pursuit or transition into containment mode. The pursuing officers should assess and communicate with each other before deciding on a course of action.

If the suspect is no longer in sight or enters a structure such as a house, apartment or business, or gains a tactical advantage, officers may make the decision to continue the pursuit in containment mode while coordinating the response of additional units to establish a perimeter. Containing a suspect in a specific area can decrease the opportunity for an ambush and will make it more likely that the suspect will be taken into custody.

When the decision is made to establish a perimeter, officers should act quickly to prevent the suspect's escape and broadcast the following:

- *General location of an incident command post (the end of pursuit location). This location can be moved later.*
- *Boundaries for the perimeter. Remember it is easier to decrease a perimeter than increase one. Initially, even general locations or instructions will suffice. (e.g. 2 blocks to South and North, 2 blocks to East and West of my location).*
- *Request for air unit to assist in establishing or adjusting the perimeter. The presence of the air unit will also encourage the suspect(s) to remain within the perimeter.*
- *Request a supervisor and the necessary resources to safely handle the incident.*

Pursuing Armed Suspects: *When pursuing a suspect believed to be armed, officers should generally do so in containment mode while considering the available tactical advantages, including cover and concealment where available. The goal is to maintain observation of the suspect and the tactical advantage while coordinating the response of additional units and other resources for a perimeter with the objective of containing the suspect and taking him into custody safely. The decision to pursue an armed suspect in apprehension mode may be appropriate when the suspect is at a tactical disadvantage and an arrest can be accomplished with limited risk to officers or innocent parties (Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force-Tactics Directive, Directive No. 3.2, Foot Pursuit Concepts, October 2013).*

Officers Blanco and Chavez engaged in a foot pursuit of a suspect armed with a rifle, in apprehension mode.

Generally, officers are discouraged from pursuing armed suspects on foot. Nonetheless, officers must be afforded a level of discretion regarding the appropriateness of their decision to engage in a foot pursuit of an armed suspect. It is my expectation that officers are decisive in their actions during a rapidly unfolding, life-threatening situation while taking into consideration police work is inherently dangerous.

In this case, Officers Blanco and Chavez were in apprehension mode of an armed suspect. The officers remained on the street and utilized the parked vehicles as cover as the suspect ran on the sidewalk. Officers Blanco and Chavez maintained a line of sight with one another and remained close enough to render immediate aid, if necessary. The UOFRB presentation contained information obtained from the officers' walk-through with Captain J. Mastick, Serial No. 32471, Commanding Officer, Harbor Patrol Division.³ Officer Blanco demonstrated his knowledge of the location and that area gang members typically utilized a shortcut behind the apartment building located just north of the OIS scene at 1033 West 253rd Street, to evade officers and flee the area.

³ Supplemental Intradepartmental Correspondence, Los Angeles Police Department Form 15.02.00, completed by Captain Mastick to the Director, Office of Support Services, dated March 3, 2020, with the subject of: Walk Through Observations, FID No. 023-19.

The UOFRB also examined Officers Blanco and Chavez' decision to be in apprehension mode of an armed suspect and determined that it was vital for the officers to apprehend the suspect armed with an AR-15 style rifle, who was refusing to disarm himself. The UOFRB opined that the officers' perception of the criminal activity already conducted by Rosales at the location presented a significant concern for the safety of the community, as well as for Officers Blanco and Chavez, in addition to the other officers at scene. The officers did not have the time to allow Rosales to escape into the community armed with a high-powered rifle. The UOFRB noted that the public safety concerns of a violent suspect armed with a rifle, within an area in which many citizens reside, created an exigent circumstance that had to be quickly resolved.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Blanco and Chavez' actions were reasonable and their decision to pursue Rosales in apprehension mode was in the best interest of public safety and, therefore, was a substantial deviation, with justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 4 Utilization of Cover

Cover is defined as an object or structure that will stop the opponent's bullets. Officers should attempt to move to and use available cover when involved in any tactical situation and especially when there are weapons involved. Officers should be aware of what items in their surrounding area can be used as cover and what type of cover is required to stop specific rounds (handgun, shotgun, or rifle rounds) (Los Angeles Police Department, Basic Firearms Manual, July 2015).

There is an equation that saves lives: Distance + Cover = Time. Time gives officers options. Time is an essential element of de-escalation as it allows officers the opportunity to communicate with the suspect, refine tactical plans, and, if necessary, call for additional resources. Entering the suspect's space prematurely may force the suspect to take action, ultimately escalating the situation. Whenever possible, officers should place an object between themselves and the suspect as cover or a barrier. A barrier could be a chain link fence, wrought iron gate or any similar object that prevents the assailant from reaching the officer. If the suspect is contained and does not pose an immediate threat to officers, the public or himself/herself, time is our best tool. Time allows more opportunity to communicate with the suspect and helps to calm the situation (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Weapons Other Than Firearms, Volume XLVI, Issue 3, October 2017).

Officers Blanco and Chavez engaged in a foot pursuit with only the benefit of cover from vehicles parked on one side of the street between them and Rosales as he ran on the sidewalk armed with a weapon system similar to an AR-15 rifle.

The utilization of cover enables an officer to confront an armed suspect while simultaneously minimizing their exposure. As a result, the overall effectiveness of a tactical incident can be enhanced while also increasing an officer's tactical options.

In this case, Officers Chavez and Blanco attempted to contain Rosales in an attempt to apprehend him as he fled on foot through a neighborhood armed with a rifle. Officers Chavez and Blanco utilized a singular row of parked vehicles for cover. The UOFRB would have preferred that the officers had utilized the opposite sidewalk which would have provided them an additional row of parked vehicles and increase the distance between Officers Chavez and Blanco and Rosales.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, I support the UOFRB's determination that in this particular circumstance, Officers Blanco and Chavez' actions were not a deviation from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 5 Tactical Vehicle Deployment (Substantial Deviation – Officers Ivan and Singh)

Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

When stopping one or more suspect(s) using the police vehicle; position the patrol vehicle to maximize officer safety for both officers (Los Angeles Police Department, Regular Basic Course, Tactics Lesson Plan, Pedestrian Stops, Pages 7-8, February 2003).

Officers Ivan and Singh utilized their police vehicle in an attempt to block the path of Rosales as he fled on foot from pursuing officers. The positioning of the police vehicle when conducting a pedestrian stop is critical in order to provide the officers a tactical advantage should the incident escalate.

In this case, Officers Ivan and Singh placed themselves at a significant tactical disadvantage by positioning their police vehicle in close proximity, without cover, to the possibly armed suspect. Officer Ivan stated, "Due to the fact of an active shooter—shots in the area, hearing shots in the area, and that there's a shooter in the location...and the possible ambush," he drew his service pistol from his holster while seated in his police vehicle.

The UOFRB considered the circumstances surrounding Ivan's vehicle deployment and positioning while confronting a suspect who was thought to be armed. Officer Ivan articulated that he believed that he was deploying on an active shooter. His decision to park his vehicle in close proximity to an armed suspect significantly increased the risk to both he and his partner and was not consistent with Department tactical training.

Officer Singh observed Rosales holding his left hand to his right waistband and opined that Rosales was still armed with a firearm. The position and angle of the police vehicle relative to Rosales' location reduced the officers' ability to react to Rosales' actions and reduced their ability to utilize the police vehicle as cover as Rosales' was running toward them being pursued by other officers. The UOFRB was critical of the officers' decision and opined that the officers placed themselves at a significant tactical disadvantage, which posed an unnecessary risk to the officers.

Both the UOFRB and I would have preferred that the officers displayed greater control of the police vehicle and had stopped further back from Rosales. Positioning the vehicle further back and at a more perpendicular angle would have afforded the officers additional time and distance to assess the rapidly unfolding tactical situation.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Ivan and Singh's tactical positioning of their police vehicle, adjacent to the suspect's position, was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Profanity – Officers Blanco, Vint, and Campos utilized profanity while in foot pursuit and when handcuffing Rosales. The officers are reminded that the use of profanity may unnecessarily escalate the situation and is not in conformance with the Department's expectations of an officer's conduct. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Simultaneous Commands (Non-Conflicting) – The investigation revealed that Officers Chavez and Blanco both gave Rosales simultaneous commands. Although the commands were non-conflicting, the officers are reminded that simultaneous commands can sometimes lead to confusion and non-compliance. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Drawing Service Pistol While Seated in Vehicle – The investigation revealed that Officers Vint and Ivan both drew their service pistols while still seated in their separate police vehicles as they drove during the incident. Although the officers heard gunshots, the officers are reminded that drawing a service pistol while seated in a police vehicle can increase the chances of an unintentional discharge. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Running with Service Pistol – The investigation revealed that during the incident, Officers Vint, Bryant, Portillo, Campos, Morales, Singh, and Chavez ran with their service pistols drawn. These officers were in the same area with each other. The officers are reminded that there is a heightened concern for an unintentional discharge when running with a drawn service pistol. I will direct that this topic be discussed during the Tactical Debrief.

Crossfire – The investigation revealed that Officers Chavez, Blanco, Munoz, Morales, and Campos allowed the muzzles of their service pistols to momentarily point in the direction of

other officers, creating the potential for a crossfire situation. The officers are reminded of the importance of always being aware of their muzzle direction. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Stepping on Limbs – The investigation revealed that after Rosales was placed in handcuffs he was lying on the ground in a supine position. As officers were awaiting the arrival of a rescue ambulance Officer Portillo momentarily stepped on Rosales' foot. According to Officer Portillo, Rosales was acting aggressively and began moving his feet around. Officer Portillo intentionally stepped on Rosales' foot to prevent him from kicking officers. Officer Portillo is reminded that stepping on a suspect's limbs may result in injury to the suspect, or cause an officer to lose balance and fall. It may also give the perception of a lack of training by the officers to the general public. I will direct this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Command and Control

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII, Issue 4, Command and Control, July 2018).

The senior officer, or any officer on-scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness, shall establish Command and Control and begin the process to develop a plan of action consistent with Department supervisory and tactical training.

Sergeant West arrived at scene and through his actions assumed the responsibility of the Incident Commander. He located and confirmed that Officers Blanco and Chavez had been involved in an OIS. Sergeant West directed Officers Blanco and Chavez to turn off their BWV and took custody of their BWV devices. Sergeant West then met with Sergeant Huett and coordinated the separation of both Officer Chavez and Officer Blanco. Sergeant West separated and monitored Officer Chavez while at scene. In addition, Sergeant West obtained a PSS from Officer Chavez. Sergeant West assessed the scene and current assigned roles, and then facilitated setting up the Command Post near the OIS. Sergeant West established the inner and outer perimeters at two

separate locations, which provided for sufficient ingress and egress routes. Additionally, Sergeant West provided information and notifications to Lieutenant Loomis.

Sergeant Huett separated and monitored Officer Blanco at scene. In addition, Sergeant Huett obtained a PSS from Officer Blanco.

Sergeant Talmage ensured Rosales received medical attention and he was responsible for separating the officers involved in the NCUOF.

Detective H. Baemayr, Serial No. 26786, Harbor Detective Division identified ballistic evidence at the location of the OIS and perimeter and directed officers to secure those crime scenes.

The actions of Sergeants West, Huett, and Talmage, as well as Detective Baemayr, were consistent with Department supervisory training and my expectations of a field supervisor during a critical incident.

Lieutenant Loomis notified the Department Operations Center (DOC) of the Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) incident and made other appropriate notifications. Lieutenant Loomis arrived at the Command Post and relieved Sergeant West as the Incident Commander.

The actions of Lieutenant Loomis were consistent with Department supervisory training and my expectations of a watch commander during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Blanco, Chavez, Bryant, Campos, Portillo, and Vint's tactics did not substantially deviate from approved Department tactical training.

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Ivan and Singh's actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department policy and tactical training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were areas identified where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Although, it was determined that Officers Morales and Rodriguez were not substantially involved in this incident and did not receiving formal findings, the UOFRB recommended, and I concur, that they would benefit from attending the Tactical Debrief to enhance future performance during similar incidents.

Therefore, I will direct Officers Blanco, Chavez, Bryant, Campos, Portillo, Vint, Ivan, Singh, Morales, and Rodriguez attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics are discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On June 6, 2019, Officers Chavez and Blanco attended a General Training Update. All mandatory topics were covered including background, tactical handgun manipulations/flashlight technique, and running with a firearm.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *"An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified"* (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80).

According to Officer Blanco, as the officers approached the area of the shots fired radio call in their police vehicle, he observed Rosales on the north sidewalk of 253rd Street running east toward his location. Officer Blanco observed Rosales was holding a rifle in a port arms position with his right hand on the stock and his left hand near the barrel of the gun. Fearing that the situation may escalate, Officer Blanco exited his police vehicle and drew his service pistol.

Officer Blanco recalled,

The suspect is on the north curb of 253rd coming eastbound, I would say about three to four car lengths in front of us, but he's running -- with gun in hand, with a rifle in hand.⁴ ...I unholstered my gun due to the fact that he was be -- behind cover, he had -- I'm all like, he already has a position of advantage on us. He has a -- he has a rifle, and he's behind cover as -- as he's moving.⁵

⁴ Officer Blanco, Page 25, Line 11-16.

⁵ Officer Blanco, Page 12, Lines 21-25.

According to Officer Chavez, as the officers drove west on 253rd Street, he heard Officer Blanco state, "Oh, there he is." Officer Chavez then observed Rosales walking eastbound on the north sidewalk armed with a rifle. Officer Chavez exited the police vehicle, drew his service pistol, and began giving Rosales verbal commands to, "Stop, drop the gun."

Officer Chavez recalled,

We conduct a westbound turn onto 253. When we get a little shy of midblock, we both see the suspect which matched the description of the suspect that the PR put out was wearing a blue and white striped shirt with the rifle in the hand, walking eastbound on the north sidewalk of 253. We -- or I immediately deploy out of the vehicle. I exit -- I draw my firearm. I start giving him commands. I tell him to stop, drop the gun. At that point, he starts running. He continues running eastbound towards us on the sidewalk, but we're still on the street.⁶

I could clearly see the rifle in his right hand. I saw him walking, and I saw it crossed his body. So he was holding it with -- on the -- on the, like, I think it was pistol grip. And just swinging it as he was casually walking down the street. So with the barrel down...⁷

According to Officer Campos, he drew his service pistol at the location of the original radio call due to the comments of the radio call stating that there was a shooting at the location and his belief that a suspect may be at scene armed with a gun. Officer Campos cleared the location, looking for the suspect.

Officer Campos recalled,

The comments of the radio call said that there was a shooting so definitely there's some -- possibly someone with a gun there. I unholstered to clear the back area to look for suspects.⁸

According to Officer Campos, he drew his service pistol a second time during the incident. Officer Campos heard that the Rosales was running northbound on Petroleum Avenue. Officer Campos observed Rosales running and reaching for his waistband. Officer Campos and other officers engaged in a foot pursuit of Rosales. Officer Campos unholstered his service pistol since he did not know if Rosales was still armed.

Officer Campos recalled,

...the help call came out. I believe I heard something about suspect running northbound on Petroleum, something of that nature... As soon as I got out of the vehicle and I -- I saw the suspect as I was running towards him I unholstered... There were just shots being fired.

⁶ Officer Chavez, Page 7, Lines 5-17.

⁷ Officer Chavez, Page 12, Lines 5-15.

⁸ Officer Campos, Page 8, Lines 18-21.

Officer need help. I don't know if this suspect potentially shot on of my fellow officers. He's reaching for his waistband. I don't know if he's still armed.⁹

According to Officer Singh, he drew his service pistol twice during the incident. Due to the nature of the radio call being shots fired, Officer Singh initially drew his service pistol upon his arrival as he searched the area.

Officer Singh recalled,

When we got to the original radio call for the shots fired. As we were searching the vehicles in front of the complex.¹⁰

According to Officer Singh, the second time he drew his service pistol was when he observed Rosales holding his waistband as he fled from the officers on foot. Officer Singh feared Rosales was armed and may fire at him and in response, Officer Singh drew his service pistol.

Officer Singh recalled,

So the second time when I unholstered was when we saw the suspect running holding his waistband. I believe he was still armed at that point because of the way he was running. Because of the angle that we were at, I did unholstered my weapon in case he did decide to fire at our weapon -- or fire at our vehicle. Once he ran past us, I was still unholstered.¹¹

According to Officer Ivan, due to the comments of the radio call being that shots had been fired and also from him hearing shots being fired in the area, Officer Ivan drew his service pistol while seated in the police vehicle and canvassing the area.

Officer Ivan recalled,

As we're doing our canvas I -- I draw -- excuse me, yeah, so we're unholstered at this time. I unholster my weapon at this time. Due to the fact of an active shooter -- shots in the area, hearing shots in the area, and that there's a shooter in the location. It was dark. And the possible ambush from the night before. So I believed that all -- with all those -- with all that I had reasonable to believe -- reason to believe to draw my -- At this point that I should draw out my weapon in case there a possible ambush or in case the shooter does pop out and present himself to us -- him or herself to us.¹²

According to Officer Portillo, he observed Rosales, who matched the description of the possible shooting suspect, *running* in his direction and away from officers who were pursuing him on foot. Fearing Rosales was going to shoot him, Officer Portillo exited his police vehicle and drew his service pistol.

⁹ Officer Campos, Page 16, Lines 10-24.

¹⁰ Officer Singh, Page 25, Lines 18-20.

¹¹ Officer Singh, Page 26, Lines 13-20.

¹² Officer Ivan, Page 13, Lines 15-23, and Page 14, Lines 4-7.

Officer Portillo recalled,

...because when I saw him, I -- and I thought he was approaching us, and he matched the suspect description. He matched, you know, as possible shooter. You know, I thought -- I thought in my head he was the shooter. So I thought that maybe, you know, he was running towards me to either shoot me or hurt me or hurt my partner.¹³

So when I saw -- I'm not exactly sure the exact moment when I unholstered the gun, but I remember when I got out of the car, I had the gun in my hand. But when he started running, I started running, I holstered back up in order so I could broadcast. When I started broadcasting or direction of travel and his description.¹⁴

According to Officer Bryant, he observed Rosales exit an alley and run northbound on Petroleum Avenue toward him on the east sidewalk. Based on the comments of the shots fired radio call and believing Rosales matched the description of the suspect, Officer Bryant drew his service pistol.

Officer Bryant recalled,

I unholstered based on the comments of the call, based on the suspect coming out in front of us, suspect matching the description. That's why I drew out on the suspect. Once we started to run and I couldn't clearly see a weapon in his hand, that's when I re-holstered and continued to chase.¹⁵

According to Officer Vint, Officer Bryant made contact with a family who was sitting on their balcony and asked them if they heard someone firing a gun. As Officer Bryant was speaking to the family from the police vehicle, Officers Bryant and Vint heard approximately eight to ten gunshots. After hearing the gunshots and while still seated in his police vehicle, Officer Vint drew his service pistol and had it down at his side.

Officer Vint recalled,

It was actually when we heard the gunshots and we were on the corner. Because of how close it was, I unholstered and because I knew we were going to be right on top of it and -- ...And I had it down at my side down here ready to go... When asked by FID investigators if Officer Vint had unholstered while he was still inside of the police vehicle, Officer Vint responded, "Yes."¹⁶

¹³ Officer Portillo, Page 32, Lines 4-10.

¹⁴ Officer Portillo, Page 31, Lines 14-20.

¹⁵ Officer Bryant, Page 39, Lines 17-22.

¹⁶ Officer Vint, Page 20, Lines 9-15-25, and Lines 19-20.

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review in evaluating the reasonableness of Officer Blanco and Chavez' Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB noted that Officer Blanco and Chavez were faced with a rapidly unfolding situation during when they observed an ambulance shooting suspect armed with a rifle.

In addition, the UOFRB reviewed Officers Bryant, Vint, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Campos' drawing/exhibiting and noted that they all responded to the Ambulance Shooting radio call and subsequent Shots Fired, Officer Needs Help request. As they were responding, the officers observed Rosales fleeing the location on foot holding his waistband, a common tactic of armed suspects. It was reasonable for the officers to believe the situation may escalate to the use of deadly force based on Rosales' actions of possibly being involved in a shooting and potentially being armed. Officers were also advised by Officers Blanco and Chavez via radio transmission that the suspect was armed with a rifle.

As such, based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Blanco, Chavez, Bryant, Campos, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Vint, while faced with similar circumstances would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Officers Blanco, Chavez, Bryant, Campos, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Vint's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Use of Force – General¹⁷

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

(Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

¹⁷ Special Order No. 4, 2020 - Policy on the Use of Force - Revised, was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020, after this incident occurred.

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
 - *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
 - *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
 - *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
 - *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
 - *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
 - *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
 - *The availability of other resources;*
 - *The training and experience of the officer;*
 - *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
 - *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
 - *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances.*
- (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).

Non-Lethal Use of Force¹⁸

Officer Bryant – Takedown and Bodyweight

According to Officer Bryant, he observed Rosales exit an alley and run north on Petroleum Avenue. Officer Bryant gave Rosales several commands to stop and began to pursue Rosales on foot. When Rosales ignored his commands, Officer Bryant conducted a one-officer takedown and then placed his bodyweight on Rosales to control his movements.

Officer Bryant recalled,

Then once I caught up to the suspect, I pushed him down to the ground, and then kind of went down with him but with my knees on -- on the concrete and kind of holding him down until Officer Portillo put handcuffs on his left arm. And then that's when me and my partner grabbed for his right arm and brung [sic] it in front and put him in -- put him in custody with the -- with the second pair of handcuffs.¹⁹

Officer Campos – Bodyweight

According to Officer Campos, he observed Rosales running from a group of officers. Rosales then ended up on the ground and Officer Campos assisted by placing his bodyweight on Rosales to control his movements.

¹⁸ Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10.

¹⁹ Officer Bryant, Page 9, Lines 8-15.

Officer Campos recalled,

And I utilized bodyweight on the suspect to control him while he's being taken into custody.²⁰

Officer Singh – Firm Grip

According to Officer Singh, he observed Rosales run past his police vehicle. Officer Singh then exited his vehicle and once he approached the area, he observed Rosales on the ground with officers attempting to handcuff him. Officer Singh assisted the officers by utilizing a firm grip on Rosales' left arm to help control his movements.

Officer Singh recalled,

Once the vehicle stopped, he was -- the suspect had already run past us. We got out of the vehicle. By the time I got close to him, he was already on the ground. I helped detain him. I grabbed his left arm. And I assisted while they were trying to cuff him.²¹

Officer Ivan – Bodyweight

According to Officer Ivan, he observed Rosales running from a group of officers. Rosales then ended up on the ground and Officer Ivan assisted by placing his bodyweight on Rosales to control his movements as other officers handcuffed Rosales.

Officer Ivan recalled,

And I utilized bodyweight on the suspect to control him while he's being taken into custody.²² With my hands on his legs. And as we were going down I maintained the -- my body weight to use -- to use the ground as a controlling agent and just have -- keep the suspect's legs down while the other officers are putting handcuffs.²³

Officer Portillo – Bodyweight

According to Officer Portillo, while he was in his police vehicle, he observed Rosales running in his direction, northbound on Petroleum Avenue, being pursued on foot by officers. Officer Portillo exited his police vehicle and began to pursue Rosales on foot and broadcast his location. Officer Portillo then observed Rosales prone out on the ground and assisted the other officers in taking him into custody by placing his left knee on Rosales' right shoulder and his left hand on Rosales' left shoulder to control his movements.

²⁰ Officer Campos, Page 7, Lines 22-23.

²¹ Officer Singh, Page 7, Lines 21-25.

²² Officer Campos, Page 7, Lines 22-23.

²³ Officer Ivan, Page 24, Lines 10-17.

Officer Portillo recalled,

At some point, suspect goes down on the ground. I advised Communications that we were Code 6 on him. And we -- I approached them. I put -- at first it was just one knee. It was my left knee on top of his right shoulder. And it was going -- my right -- my left hand on top of his left shoulder because I did observe while I was approaching him he was kind of, like, moving around. So I just wanted to have -- to kind of control him to stop moving around, so have the officers be able to take him into custody.²⁴

Officer Vint – Firm Grip and Physical Force

According to Officer Vint, he observed Rosales run out of an alley and fall to the ground. Officer Vint observed Rosales get up and run northbound on Petroleum Avenue on the east sidewalk. Officer Vint utilized parked cars as cover as he paralleled Rosales from the street until he observed a police vehicle traveling southbound on Petroleum Avenue approach and position their vehicle in Rosales' path. Officer Vint then went around the police vehicle and observed officers had Rosales detained on the ground and were struggling to handcuff his arms. Officer Vint approached and utilized a firm grip on Rosales' right arm and physical force to pull Rosales' right arm out from under his body so officers could complete the handcuffing.

Officer Vint recalled,

By the time I had ran around their shop, I had seen my partner and a couple of other officers had had him detained on the ground. He wasn't handcuffed yet but he was -- he was down, and they were trying to get him in custody. So as they're doing that, I was just sort of standing by to make sure no one, you know, needed any help anywhere. I saw that they already had the handcuff on his left hand. He was face down, the suspect was. And so my partner had his right hand, but the suspect's right hand was still under his stomach. I -- my partner looked like he was having a hard time getting it out, so I grabbed the suspect's right hand and helped my partner pull it out from underneath him, move it to his back, and we got handcuffs on.²⁵

The UOFRB reviewed each application of non-lethal force utilized by Officers Bryant, Campos, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Vint. Rosales escalated the incident by fleeing on foot from the officers and refusing to submit to arrest. Throughout the incident, the officers verbalized with Rosales who subsequently physically resisted the officers' attempts to detain him. All officers used a minimum level of force to overcome Rosales's physical resistance and handcuff him.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Bryant, Campos, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Vint, while faced with similar circumstances, would believe that the same application of non-lethal force would be reasonable to overcome Rosales' resistance.

²⁴ Officer Portillo, Page 10, Lines 7-16.

²⁵ Officer Vint, Page 11, Lines 7-21.

Therefore, I find Officers Bryant, Campos, Ivan, Portillo, Singh, and Vint's Non-Lethal Use of Force to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury.*

The reasonableness of an Officer's use of deadly force includes consideration of the officer's tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of deadly force (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10).

Note: Both Officers Chavez and Blanco advised FID investigators that they believed they each had fired in three separate sequences of fire. Although the officers' BWV captured the OIS, due to the low light conditions, blurred imagery from the officers' movement, the backlighting from the illumination of the officers' flashlights, and the speed at which the multiple simultaneous rounds were fired from two officers, the FID investigators had difficulty distinguishing the officers' sequences of fire. The total time lapse of the entire OIS was approximately four seconds between the first and last rounds fired by both officers.

Officer Blanco – 9mm, eight rounds in a northerly direction, in three sequences of fire, from an increasing distance of 34-47 feet.

Volley One

According to Officer Blanco, he observed Rosales running eastbound on the sidewalk armed with a rifle. Officer Blanco gave Rosales commands to, "drop it, drop it." Rosales ignored the commands and as he continued to run east on 253rd Street, he turned his head in the direction of the officers as he pointed the rifle at Officer Blanco. Fearing Rosales was going to shoot him, Officer Blanco attempted to maintain a line of sight on Rosales as he paralleled him east at a *fast pace* and simultaneously fired two rounds from his service pistol to stop the lethal threat.

Officer Blanco recalled,

And he's still facing eastbound as -- as his head is looking -- now he's running eastbound as his head is turning southbound towards our direction as he's pointing the gun at us.²⁶

I just said to myself, "This is it..." I'm all like, he has a higher caliber weapon than I do. I'm like, all I wanted to do is just go back home to my kids.²⁷

... Still on the sidewalk. And he has just passed our black-and-white. And as he's passing our black-and-white, he's looking in our direction, trying to acquire a target...as he's looking back, he's turning the gun towards our direction. And that's when I'm telling him, "Hey, drop it, drop it." And that's when the shooting occurred.²⁸

So as he's still moving eastbound, I start moving eastbound trying to parallel to try to gain a better position, because I don't want to lose sight of him. And as I'm telling him to drop the gun, the suspect then points the rifle at -- at me. And then that's when the OIS occurred.²⁹

Volley Two

According to Officer Blanco, he assessed and observed his first rounds did not stop Rosales' actions. Officer Blanco observed Rosales continued to run east on the sidewalk while pointed the rifle at the officers. Officer Blanco ran a little bit to try to reacquire Rosales' position from behind the car and observed Rosales point the rifle at him again which prompted Officer Blanco to fire two to three additional rounds from his service pistol at Rosales to stop the lethal threat.

Officer Blanco recalled,

As he continues to move mind [sic] cover, behind a vehicle, I move -- I reposition myself to try to gain sight of -- of him. And he's still looking -- looking towards our direction, trying to point the -- the rifle. That's when I fire another volley.³⁰

Volley Three

According to Officer Blanco, he assessed and observed Rosales continued to flee on foot. Officer Blanco lost sight of Rosales behind the parked vehicles and continued to move east in the street to see Rosales' actions. Officer Blanco observed Rosales turn once again and point the rifle at the officers which prompted Officer Chavez to fire two to three rounds from his service pistol at Rosales to stop the lethal threat. Officer Blanco observed Rosales fall to the ground, got back to his feet and continued to flee north in the alley still armed with the rifle. Officer Blanco

²⁶ Officer Blanco, Page 29, Lines 9-12.

²⁷ Officer Blanco, Page 42, Lines 3-7.

²⁸ Officer Blanco, Page 27, Lines 11-14 and 17-20.

²⁹ Officer Blanco, Page 12, Line 25, and Page 13, Lines 1-6.

³⁰ Officer Blanco, Page 31, Lines 19-23.

observed Rosales look back over his right shoulder and point the rifle back towards the officers as he fled on foot.

Officer Blanco recalled,

And as the OIS is occurring, the suspect is still moving behind cover, so I lose sight a little bit of him. So I keep moving eastbound with him as my partner is right, like, a couple steps away from me, moving eastbound as well. As we're moving, the suspect continues to point the gun at me, and then he goes down as we're still -- as I'm shooting.³¹ The suspect is still pointing the rifle in my direction. And I fire an additional two -- two or three rounds. And that's when I see the suspect go down. The suspect goes down. I don't know if he's hit because when he goes down, he hits the floor and gets back up like if nothing had happened. He gets back up. The rifle is still in hand. And as he's going, he's still trying -- he's still going eastbound, and then that's when he takes the -- starts going northbound through the parking lot, but as he's going northbound, he's still trying to point the rifle in our -- in our direction, or my direction.³²

Officer Chavez -- 9mm, eleven rounds in a southeasterly direction, in two sequences of fire, from an increasing distance of 18 to 28 feet.

Volley One

According to Officer Chavez, he observed Rosales began to run in his direction armed with the rifle while he continued to give him commands to stop. Rosales ignored the commands and continued running eastbound on the sidewalk. As Rosales ran past Officer Chavez, he observed Rosales look back towards him and with his right arm extended out, Rosales pointed the rifle at Officer Chavez. In fear that Rosales was going to shoot him, Officer Chavez fired seven rounds from his service pistol at Rosales to stop the lethal threat.

Officer Chavez recalled,

And eventually, he passes us as he's running east, and we're still running east as well. And as he's going past us, he points the rifle at us. And at that point, I begin firing my weapon.³³

It was down by his side -- until he passed us -- on the sidewalk. And he would look backwards at us, or at least in my direction. And at the same time, he would lift the rifle with one hand behind him, you know, and point it in our direction. Yeah...Just pointing it in our direction as he's kind of like running on the oblique -- to the left, and the rifle with one hand pointed behind him.³⁴

³¹ Officer Blanco, Page 13, Lines 6-13.

³² Officer Blanco, Page 34, Lines 8-20.

³³ Officer Chavez, Page 7, Lines 18-21.

³⁴ Officer Chavez, Page 13, Lines 19-24, and Page 14, Lines 1-10.

The first time I realize that he had pointed the rifle at me, I had a clear unobstructed view of it -- because he was between two parked cars. I had a pretty good view of it. And then so there was cars parked on -- along the curb. All up and down the street. So and then as he was running along the sidewalk, I could still see him through the car windows. Still with running and continuing to point the gun in our direction.³⁵

Volley Two

According to Officer Chavez, as he paralleled Rosales from the street, he observed Rosales continued to flee eastbound on the sidewalk into the mouth of an alley. Officer Chavez gave Rosales verbal commands to stop and drop his gun and then observed Rosales turn back in his direction and raise the barrel of the rifle up and point it at him. Fearing he was about to be shot, Officer Chavez fired an additional four rounds from his service pistol at Rosales to stop the lethal threat.

Officer Chavez recalled,

And the whole time, the suspect is running eastbound, and I'm running eastbound, the whole time we're telling him, "Stop. Drop it. Stop, stop, stop." And he's just ignoring our commands. He's continuing to run. Eventually, he gets to a driveway on the north side of 253 just west of Petroleum. He -- he continues to go northbound through that driveway. At that point, he looks in my direction and I see his barrel come up again. I fire a few more rounds from that position. At that point, I was kind of like -- kind of like at the mouth of the driveway, like from -- on the street, gutter area, I guess would be a good description.³⁶

At -- in the driveway, I -- all I see is that barrel coming up. Just like all I -- all I saw was a rifle and just he was -- he was bringing the rifle, the, you know, the barrel of the rifle upwards and pointing it at me.³⁷

I remember him looking back at me at one point to -- in my mind, it was acquiring a target. And once he knew kind of where I was, that's when I saw the -- the barrel of the rifle come up behind, or in front of him and pointed back towards me.³⁸

So it was more of a continuous just he's still running, I'm still running with him, and I see that my shots are being ineffective, so I -- I keep shooting trying to stop him. It wasn't until I get to the -- to the mouth -- I want to say mouth of the alley, but it's the mouth of the driveway -- that I stop and fire I think three or four rounds.³⁹

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review of the investigation and considered several factors in evaluating the reasonableness of both officer's use of lethal force. The

³⁵ Officer Chavez, Page 14, Lines 21-25, and Page 15, Lines 2-12.

³⁶ Officer Chavez, Page 7, Lines 18-25, and Page 8, Lines 1-9.

³⁷ Officer Chavez, Page 17, Lines 16-23.

³⁸ Officer Chavez, Page 22, Lines 19-23.

³⁹ Officer Chavez, Page 16, Lines 7-17.

UOFRB noted that this was a dynamic and rapidly unfolding incident where the suspect pointed a rifle at the officers causing Officers Blanco and Chavez to fear for their lives. Both officers were forced to make a split-second decision to protect themselves and nearby citizens from the deadly threat. Specifically, the UOFRB noted that the incident was a stressful situation wherein the officers identified the suspect's weapon as an AR-15 style rifle capable of firing numerous rounds and with superior firepower to the officers' service pistols.

According to both Officer Blanco and Chavez, Rosales pointed the rifle at them throughout the incident, prompting them to discharge their service pistols to protect their lives.

The UOFRB noted that Rosales ran from the officers while holding onto the rifle. The FID investigators presented that Rosales maintained possession of the rifle for approximately 159 feet before he discarded it over the chain link fence. Rosales had ample opportunity to disarm himself and surrender to the officers.

As such, based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Blanco and Chavez, would reasonably believe that Rosales' actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable. Therefore, I find Officers Blanco and Chavez' Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional/Equipment

BWV Activation – The investigation revealed that Officer Singh had a late BWV activation. Officer Singh had powered down his BWV while conducting administrative duties and initially forgot to power the BWV device back on as he responded to an Officer Needs Help request. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Mastick, who advised that a six-month audit of Officer Singh's work history was conducted in relation to BWV activations. There were no deviations in BWV policy noted for Officer Singh. Captain Mastick addressed this issue through informal counseling, as well as with the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI). The Commanding Officer of Operations - South Bureau (OSB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The investigation revealed that Officer Jackson had a late BWV activation. Officer Jackson articulated that she had powered down her BWV while conducting administrative duties and initially forgot to power the BWV device back on while in the field. Officer Jackson activated her BWV while enroute to the initial radio call. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Mastick, who advised that a six-month audit of Officer Jackson's work history was conducted in relation to BWV activations. There was one prior deviation in BWV policy noted for Officer Jackson. Captain Mastick addressed this issue through divisional training, as well as the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of the OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The investigation revealed that Sergeant West turned off his BWV prior to his arrival to the OIS. Sergeant West stated that he believed he would be conducting supervisory actions which did not require the activation of his BWV. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Mastick, who advised that a six-month audit of Sergeant West's work history was conducted in relation to BWV activations. There were no deviations in BWV policy noted for Sergeant West. Captain Mastick advised that this issue was addressed through informal counseling and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of the OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Required Equipment – The investigation revealed that Officer Blanco was not in possession of his Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray or baton at the time of this incident. Officer Blanco is to be reminded to have all his required equipment on his person when conducting field duties. Captain Mastick advised that this issue was addressed with Officer Blanco through divisional training, the issuance of a Comment Card, and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of the OO concurred with this action. In addition, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Separation – The investigation revealed that Officers Morales and Rodriguez separated momentarily upon arrival to the ambulance shooting radio call. Video evidence revealed that Officer Morales exited the police vehicle and Officer Rodriguez drove approximately eight to ten car lengths forward before stopping and exiting the police vehicle. Captain Mastick advised this issue was addressed with Officer Morales through informal counseling and the generation of a SAI.⁴⁰ The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of the OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

DICVS Activation – The investigation revealed that Sergeant West turned off his DICVS prior to his arrival to the OIS. Sergeant West stated that he believed he would be conducting supervisory actions which did not require the activation of his DICVS. Captain Mastick advised that this issue was addressed through informal counseling and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of the OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Audio/Video Recordings

Body Worn Video (BWV) - Harbor Division Patrol and GED personnel were equipped with BWV at the time of the incident. Officers Chavez and Blanco's BWV captured Rosales' actions and the subsequent OIS. Due to the quality of the images and video capability given the low lighting conditions, the movements of Rosales are not visible in their entirety.

Officers Campos, Singh, Ivan, Portillo, Bryant, and Vint's BWVs captured portions of the Non-Lethal Use of Force. Due to poor lighting conditions, the images were dark.

⁴⁰ Officer Rodriguez has since separated from the Department; thus no SAI was generated. Officer Rodriguez' separation from the Department was not related to this incident.

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) – Harbor Patrol Division and Harbor Area GED vehicles were equipped with DICVS at the time of the OIS. Some of the vehicles captured the sound of gunfire; however, none of the vehicles captured visual images of the OIS.

Officers Rodriguez, Morales, Bryant, and Vint's DICVS captured the audio of gunfire.

Outside Video – None located.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'MICHEL R. MOORE', written over the printed name.


MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police

Date: 3-24-20

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC No. 023-19	CF No.	DR No.
SHOOTING		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident 1033 W. 253rd Street	RD 503	Date of Incident May 27, 2019	Date and Time of Board Review March 02, 2020 1400 Hours
Chair Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	Signature of Approving Board Members: 		
Member (Office Representative) Commander M. Rimkunas, Serial No. 32211			
Member (Police Sciences and Training Bureau) Commander R. Flores, Serial No. 30995			
Member (Bureau) Commander E. Eskridge, Serial No. 24585			
Member (Peer) Officer M. Martinez, Serial No. 42805			
Presenting Commanding Officer Captain J. Mastick, Serial No. 32471			
Notes: <div style="text-align: center;"> RECEIVED MAR 26 2020 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL </div>			
Additional Considerations: 			
Modification to Present Policy, Practices or Training: <div style="text-align: right;"> RECEIVED POLICE COMMISSION 2020 MAR 24 PM 2:57 </div>			
<div style="text-align: right;"> ■ COP Date Signed: <u>3/24/2020</u> ■ PC Date Submitted: <u>3/24/2020</u> </div>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Vint, Ryan		Serial No. 40997	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 023-19
Length of Employment 7 years, 4 months		Current Division Harbor		Time in Current Division 3 years, 5 months
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Portillo, Cristian		Serial No. 43185	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 023-19
Length of Employment 1 year, 10 months	Current Division Southwest		Time in Current Division 0 years, 7 months	
Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission		
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Blanco, Jorge		Serial No. 41341	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 023-19
Length of Employment 6 years, 0 months		Current Division Harbor		Time in Current Division 4 years, 6 months

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Campos, Daniel		Serial No. 42969	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 023-19
Length of Employment 2 years, 2 months		Current Division Harbor		Time in Current Division 0 years, 9 months
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Ivan, Daniel		Serial No. 42981	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 023-19
Length of Employment 2 years, 2 months		Current Division Harbor		Time in Current Division 0 years, 9 months
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

***A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.**